



hen the United Nations
Development Program published
its Human Development Report
2000, its calculation of a Human
Development Index put Canada in first place
among all the world’s nations. Norway, the
United States and Australia were close
behind, but for some observers the first-place
ranking was all that mattered.1 The
Weighted Index of Social Progress (WISP),
however, ranked Canada 31st — approxi-
mately on a par with Hong Kong, marginal-
ly behind the United States and well below
all European countries.2
By what criteria should one choose
among indices of “social progress”?
If we are to agree on a measure of social
progress we have to agree on the scope of the
adjective “social” and the meaning of
“progress.” It is clear that if we wanted to
consider only the economic dimensions of
well-being, there would be no need to use
the term “social,” but it is equally clear that
economic and social issues are closely linked.
The linkage arises partly because economic
development and prosperity are important
determinants of “sociological” change and
partly because the resources produced by
economic growth enable social policy expen-
ditures. The relationship between economic
and social issues is also reciprocal, since the
process of economic production has social
implications and social change strongly influ-
ences economic events. As a consequence of
this interdependency, it is in practice very
difficult to draw a clear dividing line
between “economic” and “non-economic”
issues, but it is clear that, whatever the line,
economics is only part of life. Since a reason-
able definition of “social” must reflect a
broader conception of events than the pure-
ly economic, this article considers economic
issues as a subset of social issues and social
progress as referring to the progress of socie-
ty on both social and economic dimensions.
What, then, is “progress”? The com-
mon meaning is “advance or development
toward completion, betterment, etc: improve-
ment” (Canadian Oxford Dictionary 1998, p.
1155). However, “betterment” or “improve-
ment” implies some conception of “good”
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Osberg.qxd  22/05/01  4:22 PM  Page 23being.” While constructed by a variety of
authors using an array of methodologies and
calling themselves a variety of names (“qual-
ity of life indices,” Human Development
Index, Index of Social Health, Index of Social
Progress, etc.), all social indicators attempt
to measure aspects of social progress. Hagerty
et al. (2001) and Sharpe (1999) have recent-
ly surveyed the literature from their own per-
spectives. The subsequent section of the essay
examines a few of the indices most common-
ly cited from the perspective of whether or
not they measure the satisfaction of needs
(i.e., basic human rights) or wants.
The essay concludes with a discussion
of possible empirical measures of trends in
social progress in a country such as Canada.
NEEDS
Rights and Needs
How can we decide what basic human
needs are?
For some people, the issue is straight-
forward. Those who believe that the Word of
God is directly revealed in an authoritative
text will look to that text for guidance. For
them, the only important issue in defining
and measuring social progress is the correct
interpretation of the sacred text. The Taliban
regime in Afghanistan and fundamentalist
Christians in Canada disagree about which
text (the Koran or the Bible) should be
regarded as the revealed Word of God, but
they concur in their reliance on divine reve-
lation. Other fundamentalist groups appeal
to other holy books, and all fundamentalist
groups must find a method of choosing
between alternative versions of the sacred text
and among interpretations of the text in the
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those outcomes. The idea of social progress
therefore presupposes some conception of
“the good” and some way of knowing
whether society is getting closer, or further
away. There are a broad variety of economic
and social outcomes, each of which is experi-
enced to a different degree by millions of
individual citizens. Any summary index of
social progress must therefore specify a list of
social issues and find a way of weighing the
relative importance of improvement or dete-
rioration in each potential social and eco-
nomic outcome for all persons — that is, a
method of aggregating outcomes over indi-
viduals and across types of outcome. What
criteria can guide this process?
In common usage, people often draw
a distinction between needs and wants —
and think of progress in terms of first meet-
ing needs and then satisfying wants. This
essay proposes the same hierarchy. The next
section discusses how one might specify such
a distinction. It argues that basic human
rights should be thought of as needs,
and that Canadian society has already com-
mitted itself to a definition of such rights in
signing and ratifying a series of internation-
al covenants such as the UN Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (1966).3 One measure of
social progress in Canada would therefore be
the percentage of Canadians who actually
enjoy their basic human rights.
Human Resources Development
Canada (1997) notes that, after an extended
dormant period lasting from the late 1970s
through the early 1990s, “social indicators
are back in vogue. Social analysts are show-
ing interest once again in identifying and
standardizing measurements of human well-
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however, the line of moral authority is clear.
If this essay were being written a cen-
tury ago, its social context would be a Canada
in which official pronouncements reflected a
widespread and largely unquestioned faith in
the virtues of Christianity, the British Empire
and a set of social practices somehow associ-
ated4 with both. Religious hegemony and the
British Empire are now gone, and Canada,
like other secular modern societies, has a
more subtle problem. As a practical matter,
when a number of groups of people believe
in different sacred texts, peaceful cohabitation
of the same geographic space requires some
level of tolerance of alternative viewpoints.
Tolerance necessarily implies that no partic-
ular sacred text should be granted prece-
dence. In the Canadian context, as the
pluralism of Canadian society has grown over
time, it has become less and less possible to
justify definitions of the good to which social
progress corresponds by appeals to biblical
references or the presumption of a “Judeo-
Christian heritage” or the civilizing virtues
for the Empire of “British values.” However,
the historical evidence is clear that such
appeals have been important in the past.
What is to take their place?
Moral philosophers who attempt to
articulate a vision of social progress that does
not rely on explicit divine sanction or ethnic
traditionalism must start somewhere. For
many,5 the basic starting point has to be the
individual — the conception, as Rawls6 puts
it, that “each person possesses an inviolabili-
ty founded on justice that even the welfare of
society as a whole cannot override” (Rawls
1971, p. 3). The liberal project in political
thinking starts from the conception that all
persons have the right to choose the param-
25
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eters of the life they personally value. “The
presupposition of liberalism (as a philosoph-
ical doctrine), as represented by Locke, Kant
and J.S. Mill, is that there are many conflict-
ing and incommensurable conceptions of the
good, each compatible with the full autono-
my and rationality of human persons.
Liberalism assumes, as a consequence of this
presupposition, that it is a natural condition
of a free democratic culture that a plurality
of conceptions of the good is pursued by its
citizens... The consequence is that the unity
of society and the allegiance of its citizens to
their common institutions rest not on their
espousing one rational conception of the
good, but on an agreement as to what is just
for free and equal moral persons with differ-
ent and opposing conceptions of the good”
(Rawls 1982, p. 160).7
In this conception, social progress must
be measured in the “enabling” sense that a
society progresses when it enables more of its
citizens to choose the kind of life they per-
sonally have reason to value. However, if
individuals are to exercise their personal
autonomy in a meaningful way, their choic-
es must be free and informed. In the work of
Rawls and other moral philosophers (see, for
example, Elster and Roemer 1991), there is
a clear distinction between the primary
goods, such as equal basic liberties, which are
preconditions for effective individual auto-
nomous choice, and the objects of those free
and informed choices.
If some social, legal and economic
outcomes are preconditions for individuals
to exercise autonomous choice in the satis-
faction of their wants, then these “needs”
must be distinguished from, and have pri-
ority over, “wants.” As well, if actual
human individuals are both autonomous
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tem exists to interpret the law in concrete sit-
uations and to reconcile apparent conflicts in
the law.
In thinking about how to define the
basic human rights which are the primary
needs of citizens, these institutional mecha-
nisms are a great advantage. Social philoso-
phers (e.g., Sen 1985, 1999) have attempted
to reason from first principles to establish the
capabilities, freedoms and rights which are
essential preconditions for the autonomy of
all citizens. However, their writings ulti-
mately represent the reasoned opinion of the
author alone, which may or may not be per-
suasive to others.8 It is unclear what percent-
age of the population needs to be convinced
of the merits of a philosophical argument, or
whether the criterion for acceptance is popu-
lar or academic opinion. Furthermore, the list
of basic needs enumerated is invariably spec-
ified at a high level of abstraction and is often
consciously incomplete (i.e., generally phrased
and non-exhaustive).9
Philosophical discourse offers no way
to verify the general acceptance of a specific
list of human rights and has no mechanism
for finding a balance among conflicting
objectives or for interpreting general state-
ments in a particular social context.
Although, in practice, the political, social
and economic rights enumerated by different
authors have much in common, the ultimate
arbiter of philosophical consensus is cogency
of argument (as, for example, in the argu-
ment that literacy and basic education are
prerequisites for the informed free choice of
autonomous individuals).
Despite these difficulties, there is
much to learn from philosophical debates. In
particular, in the philosophical literature
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and social, embodying both a unique indi-
viduality which has a right to self-expres-
sion and a social personality that requires
satisfying interpersonal relationships, the
concept of “needs” must embrace the pre-
requisites of both autonomy and support-
ive relationships.
Although liberal, pluralist societies
lack a common ethnic tradition or divine-
ly ordained criteria for judging social
progress, real-world decisions on public
policy have to be made. Democratic soci-
eties claim legitimacy for these decisions
from the institutions which produce them.
These institutions function at a number of
levels in the form of constitutions, treaties,
legislation, regulations, judicial interpreta-
tions and administrative decisions, which
constitute a hierarchy of legal status. Each
level is constrained by the level above, but
all ultimately derive their claim to legiti-
macy from some expression of consent of
the citizenry, and the presumption that this
consent is free and informed.
Constitutionalism in general and con-
stitutionally embedded rights in particular
are based on the idea that there should be a
hierarchy of decision-making. The whole
point of constitutions is that, although they
are democratically adopted, they are hard to
change and their provisions trump ordinary
legislation. Because the framers of constitu-
tions and the writers of treaties recognize
that they cannot possibly anticipate the
details of all future situations, constitution-
al provisions and international treaty obliga-
tions (e.g., under NAFTA) are often written
in general language, as a framework for per-
missible later legislation and regulation.
Since the provisions of ordinary legislation
and regulations may also be somewhat
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there is a general recognition of the interde-
pendency of rights. As well, one can often
read this literature as embodying an under-
lying conception of the “person in society”
— Rawls (1982, p. 162), for example, refers
to the “social bases of self respect” as one of
the “primary goods.” However, limitations
are also apparent. Writers in the liberal tra-
dition tend to start from an emphasis on the
desirability of ensuring freedom and auton-
omy in the choices that individuals have in
society, even though interpersonal relation-
ships of any depth inevitably involve some
interdependence. As a consequence, some
feminist scholarship (e.g., England 1993;
Nelson 1995) places less emphasis on the
“separative self” and builds on a conception
of “individuals in relationships,” in which
people have both unique individualities and
social personalities and in which a basic need
of individuals is to have satisfying personal
relationships in a supportive community.
Because humans are both individual
and social in their natures, these perspectives
are best seen as complementary, but both are
a distinct contrast to some types of econom-
ic thinking. In order to motivate discussion
of efficient production, some economics texts
use the “Robinson Crusoe” metaphor to
explore how a person would behave if he or
she were maximizing utility in complete iso-
lation from other persons. In this story (the
essential aspects of which are taught to both
doctoral and introductory-level economics
students), individuals derive satisfaction only
from their own personal consumption of
goods and services. When theorists define
utility functions in which only a person’s own
consumption of goods and leisure appear, it
is (by construction) irrelevant what others do
or consume. This economist’s story of indi-
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viduals in isolation makes no sense in phi-
losophy or politics. The concepts of justice,
ethics and political activity are all inherently
social. And since a “right” is a socially recog-
nized entitlement, the lists of rights that flow
from the concepts of justice or ethics are
inherently social as well.
However, the continued debate over
these differing conceptions illustrates the fact
that academic discourse has no general insti-
tutional mechanism for deciding between
arguments or for judging the extent to which
the reasoned arguments of particular writers
are accepted as valid in the broader popula-
tion. There is also no basis except “profes-
sional consensus” (which can be hard to find)
for resolving apparent or real contradictions
or ambiguities of interpretation. Philosophy
cannot, therefore, provide specific guidance
for the immediate decisions required in day-
to-day life. Since some practical resolution of
immediate issues is needed, it is the role of
the international and domestic legislative and
legal systems to define and arbitrate values.
Law and Legitimacy
The UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights (UNHCHR) has argued:
At the core of United Nations action to
protect and promote human rights and
fundamental freedoms is the International
Bill of Rights. The Bill consists of three
instruments:
The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (1948);
The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (1966);
The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (1966).
These three documents define and establish
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
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50 additional United Nations human rights
conventions, declarations, sets of rules and
principles.
The Covenants are international legal
instruments. This means that members of the
United Nations, when they become parties to
a Covenant or other conventions by ratifying
or acceding to them, accept major obligations
grounded in law.
States parties voluntarily bind themselves
to bring national legislation, policy and prac-
tice into line with their existing internation-
al legal obligations.
By ratifying these and other binding texts,
States become accountable to their citizens,
other States parties to the same instrument
and to the international community at large
by solemnly committing themselves to respect
and ensure the rights and freedoms found in
these documents.10
International law differs from domestic
law in that international courts cannot appeal
to an international police force to exercise coer-
cive power to enforce judgements. However,
as the above quotation makes clear, Canada’s
signature on international treaties, and the rat-
ification of those treaties by Parliament, are
seen by the international community as
implying more than an empty, rhetorical ges-
ture. Specifically, the human rights enumer-
ated in the international human rights
documents to which Canada is signatory are
international legal obligations.11 Furthermore,
a system (the office of the UNHCHR) exists
to weigh the validity of individual assertions
of violation of human rights and to interpret
any ambiguity in the wording of these docu-
ments, or their relevance to a particular real-
world context. In human rights, as with
commercial obligations incurred under the
World Trade Organization or the North
American Free Trade Agreement, Canada’s
obligations under international law are inter-
preted by international institutions in which
Canada has a voice and to whose jurisdiction
Canada has formally agreed.
By repeatedly signing and ratifying
international obligations to observe specified
human rights, Canada has clearly accepted
limitations on the legitimate exercise of
domestic political sovereignty. In the same
way and by the same process, Canada has
accepted limitations on domestic legislation
by agreeing to participate in the WTO and
NAFTA. However, enforcement differs.
In practice, the contravention of trade
protocols will affect the economic self-interest
of corporate and industrial interests. These
groups typically have the wealth and political
influence to prod their national governments
into making use of the trade sanction reme-
dies built into trade treaties (as, for example,
when the United States threatened punitive
duties on Canadian steel exports, in retaliation
for Canadian tax regulations which disadvan-
taged US magazines). The rich and the pow-
erful have an interest in ensuring that the
provisions of trade treaties are actually imple-
mented, and international trade retaliation is a
convincing mechanism for punishing those
states which commit infractions.
By contrast, human rights violations are
typically experienced by people without wealth
and power. Although there is an important
sense in which the possibility of being deprived
of human rights such as free speech or shelter
diminishes the freedom of everyone (even the
affluent conformist), it is only a marginalized
minority of the population who directly expe-
rience human rights violations on a day-to-day
basis. Hence, if a government chooses to ignore
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nomic or political power are usually not imme-
diately affected, and governments typically face
little short-run sanction other than the possi-
bility of bad press.
However, human rights are central to
national identity, social cohesion and demo-
cratic political discourse in a way that trading
protocols can never be. Citizenship rights
define important aspects of identity and
mutual obligation in a pluralist society. Those
ideas of what is “the right thing to do” are also
crucial to voluntary compliance with the law,
so a common understanding of human rights
can be seen as essential to the rule of law.
A particularly important aspect of the
idea that we live in a liberal society is the
presumption that basic human rights are
unconditional and inalienable. The right to
free speech is not, for example, a reward for
“good behaviour.” Free speech is not a privi-
lege available only if individuals say the
“right thing” or if they are morally praise-
worthy on some other dimensions — and
this concept of unconditionality is equally
valid for the economic and social rights
which Canada has repeatedly ratified in inter-
national covenants.12 But there is no system
of international sanctions to ensure that a
nation actually lives up to its human rights
treaty obligations. As a consequence,
although the short-run penalty for human
rights violations for a particular government
may be small, the long-run cost to society of
undermining the bases of political legitima-
cy may be very much greater.
The Interdependence of Rights
UN General Assembly Resolution
32/130 states: “The full realization of civil
and political rights without the enjoyment
29
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of economic, cultural and social rights is
impossible.” In emphasizing that “all human
rights and fundamental freedoms are indi-
visible and inter-dependent,” the Resolution
of 1977 drew on the conception of effective
citizenship in a democratic polity, and the
rights which that requires. In voting for that
resolution, and others, Canada agreed that
human rights are essentially interdependent
in their application.
The interdependence of rights arises in
part from the fact that specific rights repre-
sent dimensions of a more basic underlying
conception. For example, underlying the
enumeration in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (1948) of such rights as free-
dom of opinion and expression (Article 19),
assembly and association (Article 20), and
participation in government and elections
(Article 21) is the conception that all indi-
viduals have the right to participate freely
and responsibly in the political and social
life of democratic communities. Arguably,
Article 26 (which establishes the right to
education) is also a prerequisite of the right
of citizens to participate in an informed man-
ner in a democratic polity. Each one of the
enumerated rights is valuable in itself, but
each is also part of a larger conception. As
well, interdependence of rights stems part-
ly from the practical realities of life. A right
to privacy (Article 12) is in practice empty
without a right to housing (Article 25).
Privacy requires control over a definable
personal space, which, in a market economy,
generally requires the ownership of proper-
ty or the income with which to rent prop-
erty. As the US courts have noted, “One of
the main rights attaching to property is the
right to exclude others,”13 and the homeless
have no such property rights. A legal “right
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international, universally applicable and
universally accepted human rights law. Since
that time this right has been reaffirmed in
a wide range of additional human rights
instruments, each of which is relevant to dis-
tinct groups within society. No less than 12
different texts adopted and proclaimed by the
United Nations explicitly recognize the right
to adequate housing.... The indivisibility
and interdependence of all human rights find
clear expression through the right to housing.
As recognized by several human rights bod-
ies of the United Nations, the full enjoyment
of such rights as the right to human dignity,
the principle of non-discrimination, the right
to an adequate standard of living, the right
to freedom to choose one’s residence, the right
to freedom of association and expression (such
as for tenants and other community-based
groups), the right to security of person (in the
case of forced or arbitrary evictions or other
forms of harassment) and the right not to be
subjected to arbitrary interference with one’s
privacy, family, home or correspondence is
indispensable for the right to adequate hous-
ing to be realized, possessed and maintained
by all groups in society.
At the same time, having access to ade-
quate, safe and secure housing substantially
strengthens the likelihood of people being able
to enjoy certain additional rights. Housing
is a foundation from which other legal enti-
tlements can be achieved. For example: the
adequacy of one’s housing and living condi-
tions is closely linked to the degree to which
the right to environmental hygiene and the
right to the highest attainable level of men-
tal and physical health can be enjoyed. The
World Health Organization has asserted
that housing is the single most important
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to privacy,” or a constitutional right to pro-
tection against unreasonable search and
seizure, is therefore meaningless unless an
individual also has rights to a definable per-
sonal space. If there is an enforceable “right
to shelter,”14 individuals may get such a
space from the State, but in its absence they
need to purchase ownership or leasehold
rights to a personal space. The homeless do
not have such a space.
Homelessness in Canada has been
increasing in recent years (see Chart 1),
and it is an issue with manifold implica-
tions for human rights. If a person does
not have a home, where do they “live”?
Where do they exercise their right to
vote? Article 6 of Canada’s Constitution
Act of 1982 may, for example, say that all
Canadians have “the right to move to and
take up residence in any province” — but
that right is hollow for the homeless. As
the UNHCHR notes:
With the adoption of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the
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CHART 1
Recent Trends in Homelessness in Toronto
















Source: City of Toronto, Community and Neighbourhood
Services, Shelter, Housing and Support Division.
http://www.city.toronto.on.ca/homelessness/index.htm
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conditions and higher mortality and mor-
bidity rates.
This relationship or “permeability” between
certain human rights and the right to ade-
quate housing show clearly how central are
the notions of indivisibility and interdepend-
ence to the full enjoyment of all rights.15
As an empirical matter, homelessness
is the extreme end of a continuum. As
Rossi (1991, p. 9) puts it, “literal home-
lessness is a condition of extreme depriva-
tion; but it is only a step away from being
precariously housed — having a tenuous
hold on housing of the lowest quality. Like
the literally homeless, those with precari-
ous homes are extremely poor. ...extreme
poverty is at the root of both literal home-
lessness and being precariously housed.
Although there is clearly a line between
those with homes and the literally home-
less, that line is easily crossed. A life of
extreme poverty is one of extreme vulnera-
bility.” That vulnerability is addressed in
Article 11 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: “The
States Parties to the present Covenant rec-
ognize the right of everyone to an adequate
standard of living for himself and his fam-
ily, including adequate food, clothing and
housing, and to the continuous improve-
ment of living conditions.”16
Measurement Difficulties
If social progress consists, first of all, in
an increase in the number of citizens who
actually enjoy all their basic human rights,
how can one tell objectively when social
progress occurs? How can one tell if a basic
human right is not fully available to the cit-
izens of a country?
Both constitutions and the internation-
al treaties which define human rights and
commercial obligations are always phrased in
fairly general terms. Their application depends
on the availability and interpretation of more
detailed specifications. Although there is a
process (through the UNHCHR) for the more
precise definition of basic human rights, and
that process has produced some fairly detailed
specifications, there is always some level of
judgement necessary in applying those crite-
ria to a concrete situation.
To take the example of housing, the
UNHCHR has specified that the right to
housing entails: “1. Legal security of tenure
2. Availability of services, materials and infra-
structure 3. Affordable housing 4. Habitable
housing 5. Accessible housing 6. Location 7.
Culturally adequate housing.” Each aspect has
been specified further — for example, afford-
ability has been defined as implying that “per-
sonal or household costs associated with
housing should be at such a level that the
attainment and satisfaction of other basic
needs are not threatened or compromised.
Housing subsidies should be available for
those unable to obtain affordable housing, and
tenants should be protected from unreasonable
rent levels or rent increases.”
Although human rights covenants offer,
in principle, a guide for the construction of
indices of social progress, there are important
empirical problems in measuring the extent
of their implementation. The interdependence
and multidimensionality of basic human
rights make it difficult to argue for a simple
“box score” of the number of rights actually
enjoyed by a specific person. Although on any
given issue there is a court-like process in
Geneva which can attempt to ascertain
whether the specific situation of a particular
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cific right, that process is far too expensive and
too difficult to replicate for general statistical
purposes. If time trends for the population as
a whole are to be discerned, some statistical
rules of thumb must be agreed.
To measure, for example, whether a
“right to housing” is in practice being hon-
oured, statisticians need empirical criteria.
In almost all instances, one can think of the
fulfilment of a “right” as multidimension-
al. On some dimensions of adequacy one
may observe discrete changes (e.g., the pres-
ence or absence of indoor plumbing or run-
ning water), but on others (e.g., floor area
per household member) continuous varia-
tion is possible. The Canada Mortgage and
Housing Corporation determines the per-
centage of Canadians in core housing need
using the criteria of adequacy (no major
repairs needed), suitability (enough bed-
rooms for each person over age five) and
affordability (costing less than 30 percent of
before-tax household income). In 1996
approximately 18 percent of Canadians were
in core housing need according to one or
more of these criteria.17
Since housing adequacy differs on a
number of dimensions (such as space and state
of repair) and since minimum requirements
differ among societies, the measurement of a
right to housing has a cultural relativity prob-
lem similar to the measurement of poverty
more generally. In the context of poverty, Sen
(1992) comments: “Relative deprivation in the
space of incomes can yield absolute deprivation
in the space of capabilities. In a country that is
generally rich, more income may be needed
to buy enough commodities to achieve the
same social functioning, such as ‘appearing in
public without shame.’ The same applies to
the capability of ‘taking part the life of the
community’ ” (p. 115).
To again use the example of the right to
housing, although the UNHCHR specifies
that this entails “sustainable access to clean
drinking water, energy for cooking, heating
and lighting, sanitation and washing facili-
ties,” that definition is sufficiently broad to
encompass the reality of sub-Saharan Africa
and Canada. In the context of Tanzania or
Nigeria, “adequacy” does not generally require
a source of heat and might well be considered
satisfied with outdoor plumbing and commu-
nal water taps. In all parts of Canada, people
without heat will freeze in winter and indoor
plumbing and running water would be con-
sidered minimal (indeed, in present-day
Canada, houses without indoor plumbing or
running water are legally substandard and can
be ordered demolished).
The argument over how best to define
basic social and economic rights has much
in common with the debate over how best
to measure poverty. In both cases, it is wide-
ly granted that the dividing line between
“deprivation” and “non-deprivation” is
imprecise — but this does not imply that
the distinction is meaningless. In both
cases, it is widely recognized that standards
may change over time, and will often differ
across countries.
In the poverty debate, defenders of the
idea of an absolute poverty line argue that
poverty is not a purely relative phenomenon
and should be measured with reference to a
“budget standard” — a specific list of com-
modities whose cost defines the poverty
line. In the measurement of economic
and social rights, defenders of a similar
“absolute” conception of rights would pre-
sumably argue that similar methods should
32
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An alternative conception of basic
human rights would see them as absolute in
the space of capabilities but relative in the
space of resources. In this view, the norms
which define housing adequacy or suitabili-
ty depend implicitly on what is the “normal”
state of repair and amount of space available
to the population as a whole. “Housing need”
would therefore be defined with specific ref-
erence to community housing standards.
As with many issues in economics, the
real objective in the measurement of social
and economic rights is reliable comparisons
over time, or across jurisdictions, rather
than absolute accuracy in estimating the
level at a particular place or time. To take
the example of homelessness and the right
to housing, careful observers will agree that
it is difficult to make accurate statistical
observations on a transient population and
to distinguish between precarious housing
and homelessness. As well, there are people
who choose to sleep in a cardboard box in
the middle of winter — although for the
marginally mentally ill the concept of
“choice” can be problematic.
But there is nothing unusual about
these sorts of measurement difficulties. One
can compare them to difficulties in the meas-
urement of unemployment, in which there
are important statistical ambiguities and a
continuing controversy over the percentage
of “voluntarily” unemployed. Because of
these measurement difficulties, the “headline
number” on the unemployment rate is actu-
ally only one of a range of calculable unem-
ployment rates, each corresponding to
particular technical measurement choices.19
However, despite these difficulties the unem-
ployment rate remains a useful statistic as
long as the same concept of unemployment
is being compared, over time or across juris-
dictions, and as long as there is no persuasive
reason to believe that measurement difficul-
ties or the percentage of “voluntarily” unem-
ployed have suddenly changed. Likewise,
comparability is the important issue in meas-
urement of trends in rights.
This section has argued that interna-
tional human rights agreements have distinct
advantages over the reasoned introspection of
economists and social philosophers as a guide
to the measurement of social progress (i.e.,
formal approval by a democratic process, rel-
atively clear specification and an institution-
al mechanism for interpretation in particular
contexts). The interdependence of human
rights and the difficulties of measuring them
do, however, create significant empirical
problems. To what extent can the human
rights perspective be empirically embodied
in operational measures of social progress?
INDICES OF SOCIAL PROGRESS
This essay has argued that Canada’s
international legal obligations with respect
to human rights should be used as a guide in
identifying the “needs” of Canadians and
determining whether they have been met. It
has also argued that social progress consists
of first meeting “needs” and then satisfying
“wants.” To illustrate some of the divergences
of existing measures from this standard, this
section examines a few of the available quan-
titative indices of social progress, using the
prism of human rights. No attempt is made
to be comprehensive and cover all published
indices, since Hagerty et al. (2001) have
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of criteria). Rather, this section is intended
to be illustrative, and to indicate how a
human rights perspective might be used as a
criterion of social indicators.
Human Development Index (HDI)
The Foreword to the UNDP’s Human
Development Report 2000 begins with this
statement: “The goal is to achieve all human
rights — civil, cultural, economic, political
and social — for all people. Access to basic
education, health care, shelter and employ-
ment is as critical to human freedom as polit-
ical and civil rights are” (United Nations
Development Program 2000, p. iii).
However, basic human rights considerations
play little role in the actual calculation of the
Human Development Index. The HDI is cal-
culated as the average of three components:
(1) average life expectancy at birth; (2) the
logarithm of adjusted per capita GDP (meas-
ured in Purchasing Power Parity adjusted US
dollars); and (3) a combination of the adult
literacy rate (two thirds weight) and the com-
bined gross primary, secondary and tertiary
enrolment ratio (one third).
Since Article 26 of the UN Universal
Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the
right to education, the last component of the
HDI might be seen as loosely linked.
However, the enrolment number used in cal-
culating the HDI is an aggregate of overall
levels of education. Therefore it would be pos-
sible for the index to increase if some people
were denied access to primary school — as
long as others attended school for a sufficient-
ly increased length of time. In general, indices
which are constructed from underlying popu-
lation averages will not necessarily reflect vio-
lations of human rights. Statistics such as the
logarithm of GDP per capita or average life
expectancy are completely insensitive to the
distribution of income and the distribution of
life expectancy, and therefore cannot reflect the
denial of basic rights to part of the population.
Even if an increase in the average is attained
at the cost of greater and extreme deprivation
of some, the index will increase as long as the
gains of the winners are sufficiently large to
cover the losses of the disadvantaged.
Hence the HDI is, despite its intro-
ductory rhetoric, quite insensitive to denials
of human rights. Although the HDI does not
in fact reflect human rights issues, it is at
least calculated in a straightforward and eas-
ily understood way. This ease of understand-
ing undoubtedly aids its acceptance by the
broader public.
Weighted Index of Social
Progress (WISP)
Ease of understanding of the underly-
ing calculations is not a characteristic of the
WISP. Hagerty et al. (2000, p. 47) summa-
rize the WISP as a measure of “adequacy of
social provision”:
“Adequacy of social provision” refers to the
changing capacity of governments to provide
for the basic social, material, and other needs
of the people living within their borders (e.g.,
for food, clothing, shelter, and access to at
least basic health, education, and social serv-
ices, etc.) (Estes 1984).
The ISP consists of 46 social indicators
that have been subdivided into ten sub-index-
es: Education, Health Status, Women Status,
Defense Effort, Economics, Demographic,
Geography, Political Participation, Cultural
Diversity, and Welfare Effort. All 46 indi-
cators “are known to be valid indicators of
social development; indeed, the majority of the
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other scholars of socioeconomic development”
(Estes 1997, p. 3) ...Estes has subjected them
to a two-stage varimax factor analysis in
which each indicator and sub-index was
analyzed for its relative contribution toward
explaining the variance associated with
changes in social progress over time. Exactly
how this “changes in social progress over time”
criterion for the factor analysis is defined is
not specified in Estes’s articles. To determine
this...Estes (1988) must be consulted.
Standardized scores of the component indica-
tors then were multiplied by the factor load-
ings to create weighted sub-index scores which
then were summed to obtain the “Weighted
Index of Social Progress.”
The WISP can therefore be seen as a
measure that begins with a conception of
social progress which is quite close to the
human rights agenda but whose link to
human rights — in speaking to an academ-
ic audience among whom technical sophis-
tication in statistical methodology is
highly valued — loses clarity of linkage to
human rights. In a sense, the WISP is
adding up many of the “right things” but
in a way that is so unclear that one is
unsure as to the answer.
Why does the WISP rank Canada so
low, when the HDI ranks it so high? Since
the HDI puts heavy weight on average life
expectancy and overall educational delivery,
Canada does well, and the logarithmic trans-
formation of GDP per capita tends to scale
down the US advantage on that dimension.
The WISP, however, also considers such
issues as the relative position of women and
the extent of welfare state policy effort, on
which Canada does much more poorly in
comparative terms. Hence, the probable rea-
son for Canada’s fall from first (HDI) to 31st
(WISP) in international ranking is the
greater breadth of coverage of the WISP —
but the complexity of the WISP calculation
prevents a clear comparison.
Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI)
However, although the WISP is very
complicated in its methodology, simple addi-
tion is not a good solution if one adds up
things unrelated to human rights. As Sharpe
(1999) argues: “The GPI can be broadly split
into two blocks: a measure of current eco-
nomic welfare and a measure of sustainable
economic development. Elements of current
economic welfare consist of consumer spend-
ing, government spending, nonmarket pro-
duction and leisure, and external factors.
Sustainable economic development includes
depletion of natural resources [non-renewable
energy and farmland]; net investment in pro-
duced business fixed assets; net foreign lend-
ing and borrowing; long-term environmental
damage [greenhouse effect and ozone deple-
tion]; and long-term ecological damage
resulting from loss of wetlands and harvest-
ing of old-growth forests.”
Viewed through the prism of basic
human rights, since the measures of current
economic welfare included in the GPI consist
of economy-wide aggregates (such as total con-
sumer spending or total change in leisure
time), the GPI is insensitive to any event which
causes deprivation of individual human rights
as long as the gains of the winners are larger
than the losses of the losers. In particular, as the
history of the US income distribution from
1980 to 1995 illustrates, average consumer
spending and extreme deprivation can easily
rise at the same time if the gains of the very
affluent are larger than the losses of the poor.
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environmental issues are potentially relevant
for a measure of environmental progress. The
international environmental commitments
which Canada has made to other nations and
the global community (e.g., in Kyoto) are in
principle relevant to defining environmental
progress, in the way that the human rights
commitments of Canada are relevant to social
progress. In practice, however, the environ-
mental component of the GPI is heavily
weighted to such issues as the cutting of old-
growth forests and the preservation of wet-
lands. Although some environmental issues
(such as depletion of the ozone layer and the
rising risk of skin cancer) concern the health
and well-being of humans, others are of a
quite different dimensionality. Protection of
old-growth forests may be of symbolic, eco-
logical or cultural value, but it does not pro-
tect human well-being or human rights in
the sense of human rights protocols. Most of
the environmental component in the GPI is
thus not relevant for a human rights-based
approach to social progress.20
In short, the GPI is not linked in any
discernible way to social progress, as inter-
preted from a human rights perspective.
Index of Economic Well-Being
(IEWB)
In a series of papers, Osberg (1985) and
Osberg and Sharpe (1999, 2000) outline a
methodology for calculating an index of eco-
nomic well-being (IEWB), which is a
weighted average of measures of per capita
consumption, aggregate accumulation,
income distribution and insecurity. Trends in
the index for Canada in the 1990s and their
relationship to economic performance are dis-
cussed in the paper by Osberg and Sharpe
later in this volume. As the name indicates,
the index is intended as a measure of eco-
nomic well-being only, and does not pretend
to indicate overall social progress, which is a
broader concept. Since the index is calculated
as a simple weighted average of four compo-
nents, the authors stress that observers who
differ in their values can choose the relative
emphasis they wish to place on (for example)
income distribution, compared to trends in
average consumption. Most of the work
involved in construction of the index arises
in attempting to get a better measure of
trends in aggregate accumulation or average
consumption than is available for the System
of National Accounts. GDP statistics do not
include consideration of many issues (like
trends in leisure time, life expectancy or
economies of scale in household consump-
tion) which affect the utility individuals
derive from consumption and ignore the
accumulation or dissipation of real wealth in
the form of human capital, the environment
or research and development — but the
IEWB does include these items.
The components of the IEWB that
are based on societal aggregates (i.e., aver-
age consumption or total wealth accumula-
tion) are insensitive to human rights issues
in the same way that the GPI and the HDI
are. However, the IEWB is clearly related
to the human rights agenda in its insecuri-
ty component, which is explicitly based on
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Article 25 of which states: “1. Everyone has
the right to a standard of living adequate
for the health and well-being of himself
and of his family, including food, cloth-
ing, housing and medical care and neces-
sary social services, and the right to
security in the event of unemployment,
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other lack of livelihood in circumstances
beyond his control.”
The insecurity component of the index
is explicitly based on the risks of unemploy-
ment, sickness, “widowhood” and old age.
The income distribution component (which
is a weighted average of aggregate inequality
and poverty measures) allows for some vari-
ation in the relative emphasis on inequality
among “middle class” persons or poverty
(which is a summative index of the named
items of food, clothing and housing identi-
fied in Article 25). Since the IEWB, by con-
struction, lets observers select the weights
they personally consider appropriate, it is
open to a human rights emphasis in a way
that many other indices are not.
Furthermore, in providing a fuller
measure of economic well-being, the IEWB
offers a way of measuring progress in the sat-
isfaction of “wants,” should Canadian socie-
ty get to the point where “needs” are
satisfied. Although it may not be for a while,
one can at least hope that Canada will be in
the position, at some point in the future,
where all the fundamental social and eco-
nomic human rights are actually the lived
experience of all Canadians. At that point,
improvements in average consumption and
accumulation will become relevant for a
measure of social progress.
CONCLUSION
This essay has used the basic human
right to housing as an example of Canada’s
international commitment to a set of criteria
that define minimal citizenship rights — but
the human rights agenda is clearly much
broader.21 In examining what a human rights
agenda might bring to the assessment of
social progress, the essay has also examined a
number of existing indices of social progress
through the prism of a human rights per-
spective. The general moral is threefold: (1)
data based on population means or totals can-
not reveal the denial of rights to a minority;
(2) social progress is about human outcomes,
and is thus distinct from many environmen-
tal issues; and (3) excess complexity in data-
processing can obscure the meaning of any
underlying link to human rights.
However, existing indices are necessar-
ily based on whatever statistics happen, now,
to be gathered by statistical agencies. In prin-
ciple, statistical agencies could collect new
types of data, and obtaining reliable statis-
tics on homelessness is an example of the
type of data-gathering initiative that a
human rights perspective on social progress
would suggest. However, new data are not
always necessary. In some instances, one may
have good grounds for believing that proxy
measures are available now and are a reliable
guide to rights attainment. For example, the
right to “adequate food, clothing and hous-
ing” is highly likely to be satisfied for the
non-poor — so existing statistical sources on
poverty trends may well suffice. In other
instances, closer attention to existing data
may be all that is required — for example,
the issue of whether the “right to vote” is
actually delivered can be checked by using
census records to examine the percentage of
Canadians who are not on the voters list.
In constructing summary statistics (as
in an index of social progress) one needs to be
clear about: (1) the population whose out-
comes are relevant; (2) the outcomes, and
their measures, that are being considered;
37
Needs and Wants: What Is Social Progress 
and How Should It Be Measured?
Osberg.qxd  22/05/01  4:22 PM  Page 37and (3) the aggregation function that sums
across outcomes and individuals. This essay
has started from the point of view that the
relevant population is all the residents of a
country. It has proposed that “needs” be
given priority over “wants” and that the list
of outcomes that are considered “needs” be
drawn from the international covenants on
basic human rights that a country has dem-
ocratically agreed to. Adding up the lack of
a particular basic human right involves a fair-
ly straightforward calculation of the rate of
non-satisfaction. A much more difficult issue
is whether and how to aggregate across dif-
ferent outcomes. For the moment, however,
it would represent significant progress in
understanding if statistical agencies were to
publish data on the percentage of the
Canadian population who now enjoy each of
the fundamental human rights which Canada
has promised to deliver.
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1 The UNDP Human Development Index was
.935 in Canada, .934 in Norway and .929 in both
the United States and Australia. See United
Nations Development Program (2000, p. 178).
2 The WISP ranking scored Canada at 77.8, Hong
Kong at 77.7 and the United States at 79.9. By
contrast, the top five countries were Denmark
(98.4), Norway (95.6), Austria (93.2), Sweden
(93.1) and France (91.9). See http://caster.
ssw.upenn.edu/~restes/praxis/tab_3.htm
3 The ICESCR was ratified by Canada on 19 May
1976. A complete listing of human rights proto-
cols can be obtained at http://www.unhchr.ch/
html/menu2/issecon.htm
4 In the Canada of 1901, social norms included
widespread racism, sexism and homophobia —
women did not yet have the vote, some legis-
lation (e.g., on immigration) was quite explic-
itly racist and homosexual relations were
illegal. The majority of Canadians in 2001
would count the degree of demise of such
norms as part of the social progress of the past
century — and a human rights perspective
would concur.
5 Hayek (1944/1972) remains a classic state-
ment of the individualist position. It argues
(pp. 64-65) that no “common ethical code”
exists that could define the “social goal” of
economic activity.
6 For economists, Rawls is probably most familiar
for his maxi-min criterion of distributive social
justice — that social progress should be judged
by the increase in well-being of the least advan-
taged. It is worth stressing that Rawls himself
put this as a secondary priority. He saw a just
society as incorporating two principles — the
equal right of all citizens to basic liberties (pri-
mary goods) and a maxi-min criterion of distrib-
utive justice with respect to income. As he put
it: “The first principle has priority over the sec-
ond, so that all citizens are assured the equal basic
liberties; similarly part (b) of the second princi-
ple (i.e. fair equality of opportunity) has priority
38
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1982, p. 162).
7 Historically, some societies have emphasized col-
lective goals — for example, public discourse in
the United States in the 1800s often referred to
a national “Manifest Destiny” and in China today
reunification is seen as an issue that is unaffected
by the wishes of the individuals actually living
in Hong Kong or Taiwan. This essay does not
follow that tradition.
8 As an example, just to make the point, it could
be argued that humans need a little beauty in
their lives, at least as much as they need religion.
(After all, the aesthetic impulse in humanity has
been evident since the earliest days, often close-
ly associated with religion.) If an argument for a
“right to beauty” were to be made (and, one must
hasten to add, it has not been made by any of the
social philosophers cited in this article) it might
or might not be persuasive to other philosophers.
However, the process of philosophical discourse
offers no clear way of resolving arguments with
finality, in a specific context.
9 See, for example, the use of “etc.” in Sen (1999).
10 Fact Sheet #21, The Human Right to Adequate
Housing. Available: www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/
2/fs21.htm
11 A listing of Canada’s international human rights
obligations, and the date of ratification, can be
obtained at www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf.
12 While it was in force, the Canada Assistance Plan
reflected this unconditionality of human rights
in making need the sole criterion for assistance.
However, the introduction of the CHST in 1996
allowed provinces to make social assistance pay-
ments conditional, implying that the “undeserv-
ing” (however defined by the local legislature)
have no right to assistance when in need, or as
defined under the UN Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Article 25.
13 The Connecticut Supreme Court, in the matter
of Connecticut vs. Mooney, on the appeal of a mur-
der conviction which turned on evidence seized
from the belongings of a homeless person, with-
out benefit of search warrant.
14 Despite Canada’s signature on numerous human
rights documents, there is no such enforceable right
to housing in Canada, in contravention of the fact
that international law obliges states to act to give
effect to their treaty commitments. The UN does
note that: “Three phrases are particularly important
for understanding the obligations of Governments
to realize fully the rights recognized in the Covenant,
including the right to adequate housing: (a) ‘under-
takes to take steps . . . by all appropriate means’; (b)
‘to the maximum of its available resources’; and (c)
‘to achieve progressively’.” None seem able to excuse
Canada’s inaction (indeed backsliding, in the fund-
ing of low-income housing).
15 Fact Sheet #21, The Human Right to Adequate
Housing. Available: www.unhchr.ch/html/menu
6/2/fs21.htm. For links to websites on home-
lessness see www.canadiansocialresearch.net
/homeless.htm
16 Hayek (1944/1972, p. 133) distinguished between
security in the sense of “certainty of a given mini-
mum of sustenance for all” and “security of a given
standard of life.” Writing in 1944, when per capi-
ta real GDP in Canada was 32.5 percent of its level
in 2000, he stated: “There is no reason why in a
society which has reached the general level of
wealth which ours has attained the first kind of
security should not be guaranteed to all without
endangering general freedom.”
17 See “Research Highlights” Issue 55-1. Available
at: www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/Research Brandolini
and D’Alessio (2000) use Italian data to illustrate
how measurement of deprivation depends, to some
extent, on the relative weight of attributes in con-
struction of a measure of housing deprivation.
18 In Australia the “budget standard” method of
measuring poverty has dominated public debate,
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Osberg.qxd  22/05/01  4:22 PM  Page 39partly because it was, historically, closely linked
to their “wages awards” system of industrial rela-
tions. As a consequence, it is probably the world’s
most highly developed. Focus-group, polling and
expenditure data are used to gauge explicitly
social norms. The “low cost standard” aims at
allowing “social and economic participation con-
sistent with community standards” — which is
arguably the norm implicit in UN human rights
covenants. The resulting estimates are in practice
approximately 70 to 75 percent of the median
living standard; see Saunders (1998, pp. 14-16 ).
Andrew Sharpe has suggested that if the incomes
of the poorest remain unchanged while rising
incomes among the affluent produce a greater
demand for housing, rising rents may imply that
homelessness increases as housing becomes unaf-
fordable. In this case, the cost of purchasing a
constant amount of shelter depends on the trend
in average incomes.
19 For example, the Canadian Labour Force Survey
counts as unemployed those jobless people who
looked for work in the last month. If job search
in the last two weeks were the criterion, fewer
people would qualify as unemployed and the
measured unemployment rate would be lower.
Alternatively, a longer reference period would
increase the measured unemployment rate.
Choosing a reference period of two, four or six
weeks is essentially arbitrary, and measurement
choices do not affect the actual reality of labour
markets — but since what we really want to do
is make unemployment comparisons, the crucial
issue is standardization of measurement.
20 Article 12 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes
“the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and men-
tal health” and specifically mentions “The
improvement of all aspects of environmental and
industrial hygiene.” Environmental degradation
that affects the personal health of humans can
therefore be seen as a human rights issue — but
not issues that affect “the environment” in some
more general sense.
21 For example, by signing the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (Article 7), Canada also committed to
ensuring: “(a) Remuneration which provides all
workers, as a minimum, with: (i) Fair wages and
equal remuneration for work of equal value with-
out distinction of any kind, in particular women
being guaranteed conditions of work not inferi-
or to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for
equal work; (ii) A decent living for themselves
and their families in accordance with the provi-
sions of the present Covenant.”
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